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Abstract
For the news industry, information is used to tell stories, which have traditionally been organized around “facts”. A growing
problem, however, is that fact-based evidence is not relevant to a growing segment of the populace. Journalists need facts
to tell stories, but they need data to understand how to engage audiences with this accurate information. The implemen-
tation of data is part of the solution to countering the erosion of trust and the decay of social discourse across networked
spaces. Rather than following “trends”, news organizations should establish the groundwork to make facts “matter” by
shaping the narrative instead of following deceptive statements.
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1. Introduction
“Fake news. It’s complicated”, writes Claire Wardle
(2017). While the term is problematic in application, it is
useful for framing the larger structural issues in the me-
dia ecosystem. Inmodern news reporting, stories are tra-
ditionally organized around facts. Due in part to the plen-
itude of online sources, however, factual reporting can
be displacedwith “alternative” narratives. The use of the
“fake news” label to denote organizational untrustwor-
thiness is a related concern, as it portrays media watch-
dogs as entities that operate to deliberately misinform.
The rising culture of institutional rejection in the United
States and United Kingdom has resulted in a coup for
fringe politics, encouraging xenophobia and hate speech
(Anderson-Nathe & Gharabaghi, 2017).
Social interaction is at the heart of the “fake news”
debate. To deconstruct the changing environment, high-
lighting the dual role of media as both sources of in-
formation and sites of coordination is vital, “because
groups that see or hear or watch or listen to something
can now gather around and talk to each other” (Shirky,
2009). Due to the disinhibitory effects of online inter-
action, ideological echo chambers, and increasing tribal-
ism (Rainie, Anderson, & Albright, 2017), the emotional
component of sharing means news can be used to target
and influence segments of the public. “If readers are the
new publishers”, writes Jason Tanz, “the best way to get
them to share a story is by appealing to their feelings”
(2017, p. 48).
As such, the study of the “fake news” ecosystem in-
volves reconstructing how audiences express sentiment
around news development. By tracing the flow of infor-
mation across expansive networks of websites, profiles,
and platforms, we can “gain insight into themutual shap-
ing of platforms and apps…as part of a larger online struc-
ture where every single tweak affects another part of
the system” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 285). With these struc-
tural considerations in mind, I outline a few considera-
tions formedia and communication research in the “fake
news” era.
2. Transparency and Trust
First, proprietary “black box” (Pasquale, 2015) technolo-
gies, including opaque filtering, ranking, and recommen-
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dation algorithms, mediate access to information at the
mass (e.g., group) and micro (e.g., individual) communi-
cation levels. In addition to the delivery of content, plat-
form tools are built from the ground-up to establish the
underlying context around users’ interactions (e.g., Face-
book’s “like” button). Van Dijck explains:
Social media are inevitably automated systems that
engineer and manipulate connections. In order to be
able to recognize what people want and like, Face-
book and other platforms track desires by coding re-
lationships between people, things, and ideas into al-
gorithms. (2013, p. 12)
Importantly, the provision of information through
opaque technologies disrupts the layer of organizational
credibility and reputational trust established in the pro-
cess of professional reporting. This lack of transparency
is also problematic in the sense that information literacy,
defined as the ability to “recognize when information
is needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and
use [it]” (American Library Association, 2000) is less use-
ful when the mechanisms used to “locate” and “evalu-
ate” the information (e.g., topical search results) are not
fully known.
3. Social Distortion
The mechanisms through which attention can be in-
fluenced is another consideration in the study of the
broader “fake news” environment. For instance, third-
party applications allow the rapid amplification of
emotionally-charged messages across platforms such as
Twitter. This strategic distortion of attention can hasten
the spread of misinformation and the establishment of
“alternative facts”:
When a Facebook user posts, the words they choose
influence the words chosen later by their friends.
This effect is consistent with prior research on emo-
tional contagion, in that the friends of people who
express emotional language end up expressing same-
valence language. (Kramer, as cited in Turow & Tsui,
2008, p. 769)
Sentiment-based sharing tools (e.g., Facebook’s “reac-
tion” emoji) further complicate the social distortion prob-
lem, as they codify and aggregate sentiment that is at-
tached to news. This means that even if a controversial
claim can be adequately “fact-checked”, it may have al-
ready sowed outrage or confusion for its target audience.
4. Attention Models
A third challenge in the “fake news” era involves the in-
dustry model traditionally focused on the “manufactur-
ing” of audiences (Bermejo, 2009). Through the collec-
tion of “detailed and intimate knowledge of people’s de-
sires and likes, platforms develop tools to create and
steer specific needs” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 345). Tech-
nology companies’ core business involves the design of
identity-based data collection and profiling systems. This
means that even the most resourceful news organiza-
tions will find it difficult to deliver news through plat-
forms such as Facebook, which can manufacture both
the audience and the audience’s “needs”. Technology
companies hold much of the data needed to fully under-
stand how information reaches audiences. This amounts
to a contemporary data blindspot, and is a factor in
the erosion of trust between news organizations and
the broader public. If critically important facts are un-
able to reach large segments of the public, then the
Fourth Estate cannot effectively function as a demo-
cratic safeguard against corruption, deception, and spe-
cial interests.
5. Trust and Data
Because the tools that the public relies on to gauge truth,
fairness, and accuracy are designed around the codifi-
cation of sentiment and the monetization of attention,
the “fake news” battle cannot be won at the level of con-
tent alone. “Indisputable facts play only a partial role in
shaping the framing words and images that flow into an
audience’s consciousness”, notes Entman (2007). Given
this scenario, objectivity, while important at the report-
ing level, is less valuable for establishing trust between
news organizations and audiences in the “fake news” era.
Asmore actors opt to go “direct” to their audiences using
platforms like Twitter, news organizations will be forced
to “follow the conversation” instead of leading the way
to establish narratives that accurately inform the public
through their reporting. In this regard, as Richard Tofel
argues, “publishing [news] and then fact-checking is not
enough” (2015).
While researchers can collect more data than ever
before, much of the data that explains how “fake
news” reaches and impacts its audiences is missing. Re-
searchers must therefore focus on innovative methods
to collect data: one technique that might help to address
the platform data gap involves network analysis, which
helps articulate the relationships between companies,
political actors, governments, and the public. Network
graphs (e.g., link maps) help make the invisible “visible”,
facilitating the system-level understanding of the “fake
news” environment. For instance, network analysis can
beused to display how information released byWikileaks
flows through forums like Reddit before entering “fact-
checking” sites like Wikipedia through article updates.
The focus on “facts” at the expense of long-term trust
is one reason why I see news organizations being inef-
fective in preventing, and in some cases facilitating, the
establishment of “alternative narratives”. News report-
ing, as with any other type of declaration, can be ideo-
logically, politically, and emotionally contested. The key
differences in the current environment involve speed
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and transparency: First, people need to be exposed to
the facts before the narrative can be strategically dis-
torted through social media, distracting “leaks”, troll op-
erations, and meme warfare. Second, while technologi-
cal solutions for “fake news” are a valid effort, platforms
policing content through opaque technologies adds yet
another disruption in the layer of trust that should be
re-established directly between news organizations and
their audiences.
The complex ecosystem of emerging platforms, prac-
tices, and policies marks the beginning of a new era in
the study of media, politics, and information. While the
mechanisms are not entirely new, when put together in
the scope of global politics and civil discourse, the effects
they generate create novel problems. Welcome to the
era of “fake news”.
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